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About the Study: The Rule of Law and Mexico’s Energy Reform/Estado 
de Derecho y Reforma Energética en México 
 
The 2013 changes to the constitutional framework and the summer 2014 enabling 
legislation in Mexico’s energy industry represent a thorough break with the prevailing 
national narrative as well as the political and legal traditions of twentieth century Mexico. 
Mexico is about to embark on an unprecedented opening of its energy sector in the midst 
of important unknown factors, as well as a fiercely competitive and expanding 
international energy market. Mexico is one of the last developing countries to open its 
energy sector to foreign investment, and although there are important lessons that can be 
learned from other countries’ experiences, this does not imply that the opening will be 
necessarily as successful as the government promises or that the implementation of the 
new laws will go smoothly. Almost certainly, after the enabling legislation goes into effect, 
important questions of law will emerge during the implementation, and unavoidably, 
refinements to the legislation will have to take place.  
 
The book “Estado de Derecho y Reforma Energética en México,” published in México by 
Tirant lo Blanch and written in Spanish, is the culmination of a major research effort to 
examine rule of law issues arising under the energy reform in Mexico by drawing on 
scholars and experts from American and Mexican institutions in order to bring attention to 
the different component parts of the new Mexican energy sector from a legal standpoint. 
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Introduction 
 
The energy reform represents a transformation in the understanding of the Mexican state 
and its role in the economic development of the country. This is a change comparable to 
the commercial opening that resulted from the signing of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), and it poses similar challenges related to the modernization of the 
nationalized industry, the guarantee of international standards of effectiveness, quality 
assurance of supply, and the protection of the environment.  
 
It is also important to recognize that the energy reform is taking place in a Mexico that has 
managed to consolidate its democracy through the alternance of power and reliable 
elections, although there is still work to be done to ensure unconditional respect of the rule 
of law.  It is still necessary to reinforce mechanisms that make it possible to be aware of 
government activity, demand accountability for its actions, and fight corruption. 
Furthermore, in the hydrocarbons sector, some old union-based practices need to be 
discarded that have created procedures that are hardly efficient and result in abuses of 
power.1 These elements are essential to achieving the modernization and development 
established as the goals of the energy reform. 
 
Throughout the 21st century, constitutional and legal reforms have been carried out to 
strengthen public information access and accountability, which represents significant 
progress. Examples of this progress are the addition of the employer’s liability clause to 
Article 109 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States (CPEUM) in 2002; the 
constitutional and legal changes of the so-called tax reform of 2008 aimed at consolidating 
budgeting for results; reforms in human rights affairs and writs of amparo in 2011; and the 
reforms of Article 6 in 2007 and 2013 aimed at strengthening the policy of transparency 
and providing the guaranteeing bodies with constitutional autonomy.  
 
Nonetheless, as has been demonstrated by the Accountability Network’s assessment, these 
mechanisms suffer from significant fragmentation (López, Merino, and Morales 2011), 
perhaps because their implementation has not yet been completed. Likewise, it should be 
noted that the weakest point of these procedures for the oversight of public work is still the 
responsibility structure. Although in 2015 there was a constitutional reform that sought to 
create a national anticorruption system,2 it is clear that currently there is no 
comprehensive and efficient regulation in this matter. Today, these reforms have become 
urgent in light of the credibility crisis suffered by the government that has caused 
deterioration in the president’s public image. He is no longer considered to be a great 
negotiator who, through the Pact for Mexico, succeeded in carrying out one of the most 
important economic reforms of the Mexican state; now, he is perceived as the head of a 
corrupt government whose conflicts of interest appear in the newspapers on a daily basis. 
This has caused a crisis of trust in all areas of government, which, without a doubt, has had 
negative effects on the consolidation of the energy reform. 
 
Therefore, it has become necessary to analyze the regulation of procedures for the 
overseeing of authorities, the evaluation of the results of their actions, and, in cases of 
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corruption, the mechanisms used to apply the respective sanctions in such a manner that 
all participants can be certain that the actions of the Mexican state comply with the law. To 
this end, this paper explores the constitutional and legal standards regarding these 
oversight systems within the scope of the energy reform. We will start with an analysis of 
these regulatory structures through the identification of their areas of validity and the 
determination of their subject matters, subjects, procedures, and sanctions.3 We will also 
analyze whether these procedures are adequate in satisfying the constitutional principles 
that the energy reform establishes as the guidelines for activity in this sector. Once we have 
delineated the systems of transparency, accountability, and responsibility, we will identify 
some of the challenges and areas of opportunity presented by the legislation in light of 
both the constitutional principles and the major international practices in this area. 
 
It should be clarified that this work focuses on the analysis of the state’s governing bodies 
and public officials with respect to their obligations regarding transparency, accountability, 
and responsibility and does not address the problem of the necessary regulation of 
publicity or the oversight of the activities of the different market agents that will 
participate in the energy sector. Although it is of utmost importance to regulate the activity 
of these agents, because they are individuals their duties of transparency, their brand of 
accountability, and even their possible acts of corruption are guided by a peculiar logic and 
are mainly regulated not by the traditional bodies that control power within the 
government, but rather by other regulating bodies that were created for such a purpose. 
 
The Rule of Law and the Energy Reform 
 
The starting point for the regulatory analysis of the transparency, accountability, and 
responsibility structures is to understand them as tools to guarantee the rule of law. 
Although the expression “rule of law” is common for a diversity of legal systems around 
the world, it is a concept with many different facets. According to the Anglo-Saxon notion, 
the purpose of the rule of law is to cause everyone to submit to the authority of the law 
through the acknowledgement of the legal equality of both rulers and subjects. The 
German concept Rechtsstaat is a means for the strengthening of public power based on the 
understanding that only this reinforcement will make it possible to carry out the actions 
that are necessary to achieve the goals of the state. In the French system, its main goal is to 
limit public power in order to safeguard the freedoms of human beings.  Thus, the 
essential elements of the rule of law are the division of power and the acknowledgement of 
a set of basic rights that exist prior to a constitution (Cossío, 2004). That the Mexican legal 
order aspires to be the materialization of the latter is accepted. In spite of the diversity of 
connotations of the rule of law, there is a general understanding that it is the control of the 
government by means of the law. 
 
Authors such as Cossío Díaz deem that the concept of the rule of law requires a renewal 
through the incorporation of tools that make it possible to deal with new phenomena. 
Therefore, the rule of law is, more than anything, a linguistic construction of a social 
character through which an attempt is made to ensure that state bodies carry out 
determined processes and omit others to preserve a certain understanding of the rule of 
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law and the goal of the state (Cossío, 2004), as expressed in the constitution. Among these 
tools are transparency, accountability, and the fight against corruption. 
 
Therefore, systems that oversee transparency, accountability, and responsibility are set up 
as elements of the rule of law. By increasing the capacity for the oversight of public power 
and fighting possible violations of the law, they are a means to supervise compliance with 
the very goals of the state.  
 
In general terms, accountability refers to the oversight of the actions of state bodies that 
increases the need for the government to obtain results through substantive decisions 
because it allows for establishing the means to the end goals, and the suitability of the 
measures adopted (Cossío, 2004). In return, the obligation of transparency, which is related 
to the basic right of access to public information, provides information regarding the 
actions of the state for many different processes, such as voting for officials, budgeting, or 
national planning. Nonetheless, interdependence exists between the systems overseeing 
transparency and accountability, as the former provides the latter with indispensable 
input—information regarding the actions of the governing bodies—that represents the 
subject matter of the accountability system. Likewise, if an authority detects illegal acts 
committed by public officials during an evaluation of a state body’s actions, it would be 
necessary to report them so that they are investigated and sanctioned according to the 
system of responsibility. 
 
These systems therefore permit the control of authorities, increase the quality of public 
benefits, and may also shed light on acts of corruption. It should be pointed out that 
proper functioning of these elements of control requires that they are clearly 
distinguished, since they have different subjects, goals, and procedures. Throughout this 
article, we will analyze each of these systems within the scope of the energy reform and 
demonstrate both the need for clear differentiatiation as well as the negative 
consequences that result from their confusion. 
 
In view of a constitutional change as significant as the energy reform, it is essential to 
establish procedures governing transparency, accountability, and responsibility that 
guarantee that the actions of the state bodies match the goals set out by the Mexican 
Constitution. Therefore, based on the explanatory memorandum of the energy reform, the 
guiding principles of its regulation are as follows: to guarantee international standards of 
transparency and accountability, as well as efficiently fight corruption in the energy sector.  
 
Likewise, Article 25 of the Constitution specifies that the activities of productive state-
owned companies must be governed by the principles of efficiency, effectiveness, honesty, 
productivity, transparency, and accountability and indicates that the laws must establish 
the mechanisms to guarantee these principles. The subsequent sections of this paper 
analyze the constitutional and legal standards regarding the energy reform that establish 
procedures for achieving transparency, accountability, and responsibility in light of the 
principles that, according to the Constitution, must govern the actions of all authorities in 
this sector.  
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Transparency in the Energy Reform 
 
Since the start of the 21st century, transparency has become one of the key elements of 
Mexican democracy. According to international rules, transparency is identified with the 
mechanisms that guarantee access for any person to the information that is generated by 
the actions of any governing body of the state. In conceiving of the rule of law as 
democratic states in which the authority exercises power only on behalf of its sovereign 
people and within the limits set forth in the constitution, it becomes evident that citizens 
have at all times the right to know about the actions of their representatives. 
 
Along this line, Article 6 of the Constitution and the General Transparency Act (LGT) 
establish the obligation to document any action carried out by government bodies using 
public resources and limits the amount of information reserved for reasons of public 
interest or national security. The purpose of this rule is to require that any action by a state 
body be documented and published, establishing maximum publicity as the guiding 
principle for these actions. This principle should be interpreted as follows: the general rule 
is to publish information, and information can only be reserved on an exceptional basis 
(López Ayllón, 2009). This means that every time information is reserved, the authority in 
question must carry out a damage test; that is, he or she must determine the reasons for 
reserving the information and weigh the effective damage that would be caused by its 
disclosure (LGT Articles 108 and 109). 
 
The CPEUM and the LGT therefore strive to guarantee that the Mexican government be 
transparent; that is, that there are no obstacles to “seeing and knowing,” and that both 
citizens and public officials can observe the decisions made by the government, what 
resources are employed, how the available means are used, and what results ensue (López, 
Merino, and Morales 2011). All of the foregoing are for the purpose of ensuring that public 
decisions can be trusted. 
 
Actually, to achieve this transparent government, it is important to overcome the logic of 
secrecy under which bureaucracies tend to operate (Arellano, 2008). Furthermore, it is 
important to remember that opacity allows bureaucracies to elude appraisal of its actions 
(Stiglitz 2003). This means that the challenge facing a system that oversees transparency is 
to successfully establish proper incentives for a bureaucracy to act in a transparent manner. 
 
In the case of the energy reform, the change in bureaucratic conventions—a playing field 
on which both government officials and trade unions have taken advantage of opacity for 
many years—is not a minor issue, particularly insofar as productive state-owned 
companies are concerned, which are set up as a hybrid between the public and the private: 
they are bodies of the state, but they must compete in the market in an efficient and 
effective manner. This is why, according to Article 25 of the Constitution, secondary 
legislation had to establish procedures to guarantee transparency of the bodies involved in 
the energy sector. This system of transparency must establish an adequate incentives 
structure so that it becomes less costly for its bodies to disclose the information (Arellano 
and Lapore 2011) than conceal it.  
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Additionally, the transparency policy governing Mexican authorities must be guided by the 
rules of the Open Government Partnership (OGP), since Mexico has been a party to this 
multilateral initiative since 2011. The OGP is a transformative element influencing the 
manner in which government information is used and shared in order to improve the 
decision-making process.4 Furthermore, this partnership creates the challenge of achieving 
global access to public information. It strives to reinforce the idea that public information 
is an essential tool for good public decision-making, for interinstitutional cooperation, and 
for the promotion of citizen participation.  
 
The OGP was designed as a type of government reorganization with the purpose of 
bringing together all agents involved in making public decisions through the generation 
and use of shared information. The right of access to information is thereby converted to a 
right of participation and assumes the use of information both by the citizens as well as 
state bodies. Therefore, information must be in an open format not requiring any software 
licenses, and must use clear language and easy access such that it actually promotes 
participation. As Albert Meijer (2013) points out, the main goal of transparency policies is to 
provide citizens with a vision and a voice. This task entails important challenges regarding 
the standardization of the manner in which information is presented and the 
methodological rigor with which information is collected and preserved, particularly in the 
case of specialized areas like those regulated by the energy reform. 
 
The rules establishing transparency procedures should clearly specify at least four 
elements: a) the subjects—on one side, the state bodies responsible for generating and 
publishing information and, on the other, the identification of users and their requests for 
information; b) the objective of the system, which is to document all acts resulting from the 
exercise of power, and publishing them in a clear and simple manner; c) the procedure of 
gaining access, whether through Internet portals or via requests for access, a procedure that 
must be simple and expedient; and d) its purpose, which is to guarantee the human right of 
access to public information as a part of freedom of expression to promote 
interinstitutional cooperation and citizen participation in the making of public decisions. 
 
Insofar as the energy reform is concerned, Article 25 of the Constitution establishes that, in 
terms of the planning and control of the national electricity system and of the public 
service of transmission and distribution of electric energy, as well as the exploration and 
extraction of oil and other hydrocarbons, the nation will carry out such activities by 
guaranteeing transparency, among other principles. Therefore, it was necessary to wait for 
secondary legislation to develop a transparency system for the sector that possessed the 
aforementioned characteristics. 
 
Unfortunately, the rules and regulations of the energy reform simply identify a series of 
requirements regarding the disclosure of information that are quite unclear and 
disconnected. Within the transitional articles of the constitutional reform, the permanent 
constituent emphasizes the need for secondary legislation to establish that all contracts 
regarding the exploration and extraction of hydrocarbons to which the state is a party must 
be granted through mechanisms that guarantee maximum transparency. In addition, both 
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bidding guidelines as well as rules and contracts must contain mechanisms for the 
publication and disclosure of the contractual terms, considerations, contributions, and 
payments set forth. Also, within the transitional articles, the permanent constituent 
expressly imposes upon the Mexican sovereign oil fund the transparency obligations that 
are established by Article 6 of the CPEUM and the corresponding law; furthermore, it 
orders the publication on the Internet of the financial results of assignments and contracts 
on a quarterly basis. Similar obligatory publication of quarterly revenue and expenditure 
reports is imposed in the transitional articles upon the National Agency for Industrial 
Safety and Environmental Protection (ASEA). 
 
Since the constitutional reform, it has therefore been required that any actions within the 
energy sector be guided by the principle of maximum publicity. The regulation 
particularly emphasizes contracts, assignments, and revenue obtained by the Mexican 
State. In spite of this mandate, the secondary legislation seems to fall short in respect to the 
implementation of a transparency system that actually permits tracking public decisions 
regarding contracts and revenue obtained through these resources, as well as their final 
destination. In general, the laws limit themselves to reiterating that the principle of 
maximum publicity must govern this activity, such as in Article 158 of the Electrical 
Industry Act (LIE).  
 
What we do find in respect to transparency regulation, as shown in the following table, is a 
set of rules within the different laws of the energy reform that, in a terse, confusing, and at 
times even contradictory manner, establish certain procedures and periods for disclosure 
of information without any clear identification of the bodies responsible for its publication, 
or the purpose and quality of the same: 
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Figure 1. Regulation of the Transparency System within the Scope of the Energy Reform 
 
  
 
 
As shown in the graphic, according to the rules set forth by Article 6 of the Constitution, 
the regulation of the system of transparency throughout the entire country would be 
carried out by means of the LGT, which establishes a national transparency platform (LGT 
Articles 49-52) and determines, among other items, the parameters regarding what kind of 
information must be published by each and every state body in a proactive manner, the 
procedures of withholding information, the minimum requirements in terms of the 
quality of information, as well as the formats for publication of the accountability 
indicators of all obligated subjects. Actually, Article 83 of the LGT also establishes the rules 
of transparency obligations in the energy sector. On the other hand, even though the 
secondary laws of the energy reform indicate that they will comply with the pertinent laws 
insofar as obligatory transparency is concerned, it is confusing that the LGT and the 
Federal Law also come in to regulate both the obligations regarding the publication of 
information as well as the reasons for withholding information. Such dispersion of the 
standards and regulations creates confusion regarding which authority must comply with 
which obligation, and regarding how and where the information generated by each of the 
created bodies must be published. For example, Article 1 of the Hydrocarbons Income Act 
(LIsH) specifies as one of its goals the obligations in matters of transparency with respect to 
the revenue that will be received by the Mexican state for the exploration and extraction of 
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hydrocarbons. Nonetheless, the transitional article of the constitutional reform establishes 
that the Mexican Oil Fund must submit a quarterly report. Article 58 of this law establishes 
that, on a monthly basis, the fund and the secretary of finance and public credit must 
publish detailed information on each contract in terms of amounts, volume, payments, and 
revenue. Article 61 again mentions the quarterly reports that must be provided by the 
Ministry of the Treasury, which must include the economic standing of the country and 
the revenue obtained—reports that must be public, according to the LGT. In turn, Articles 
88 through 91 of the Hydrocarbons Act (LH) once again list information that the National 
Hydrocarbons Commission,5 the Energy Regulating Commission, and the Secretary of 
Energy must provide to the public: information regarding contracts, biddings, and 
assignments. Likewise, Articles 76, 85, and 109 of the Petróleos Mexicanos Act (LPM) 
specify the obligation to publish information regarding contracts and their providers in 
accordance with the Federal Law of Access to Public Information (LFAIP).   
 
The situation in the electrical industry is similar. Article 11 of the LIE authorizes the 
minister of energy to issue a yearly performance report of the national industry. Article 159 
specifies that the ministry, the Energy-Regulating Commission (CRE), and the National 
Energy Control Center (CENACE) will facilitate the transparency of information on the 
electrical market guided by the principle of maximum publicity, and Article 161 
furthermore establishes that the ministry must create a special Internet site for the 
publication of information regarding contracts of productive state-owned companies, 
subsidiaries, or branch offices in Mexico or abroad. 
 
As we can see, the transitional articles of the constitution and the secondary laws impose 
the same type of obligation for publication upon the Ministries of Treasury and Energy 
and upon the Mexican Oil Fund; they also establish different timeframes without justifying 
in any manner the reason for any difference. In the case of the electrical energy sector, the 
laws require a special portal where such information must be published, although they do 
not specify where such information will be available for the LIsH and the Fund. 
 
There is also no rule whatsoever in respect to the quality of information and the necessity 
for such information to be provided in clear language and in an open format to guarantee 
its usability. The foregoing is especially delicate because it is common practice to present 
these reports in PDF format, which makes them unusable (Métrica 2014) and violates the 
commitments established in the OGP Action Plan of 2013-2015. Even though the failure to 
regulate not only what information is presented, but rather the format in which it is 
presented as well as the practice of duplicating reports, is repeated throughout all 
secondary laws of the energy reform. This lack is especially delicate insofar as the 
regulation of the formats in Article 32 of the LH is concerned. This law establishes the 
National Center of Hydrocarbon Information, the body responsible for the collection, 
safeguarding, administration, and updating of information.  
 
Despite the fact that it is recognized that the complexity of the industries regulated by the 
energy reform, particularly within the scope of a public-private partnership, requires that 
the rules and regulations in matter of transparency have certain particularities, the 
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dispersion and complexity of what we have stated so far is not justified. In this respect, 
proposals from organizations such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(2013) should be taken into account. They propose models for reports about resources 
from extractive industries that are uniform, understandable, and consolidated. 
Furthermore, it is desirable that such information be presented on a single website, in 
conformity with the requirements of the OGP Action Plan. In this respect, the efforts of the 
National Hydrocarbons Commission must be recognized, which, for the so-called “Round 
1” bids, created a portal for the publication of any relevant information. The Commission 
has also set up a mechanism of communication with interested parties—a window where it 
receives recommendations and addresses them. Likewise, the decree establishing the 
regulation in matters of open data6 establishes that productive state-owned companies 
must publish their databases for the purpose of facilitating access, use, reuse, and 
redistribution via the portal (www.datosabiertos.gob). However, the proliferation of sites 
over which information regarding the energy sector is scattered continues, which 
ultimately renders the access to and use of the information difficult. 
 
As a matter of fact, even on a regulatory level, the manner in which the information is 
scattered is worrisome, and the new LGT does not manage to resolve it. It is not even clear 
how public information on the energy sector will be linked to the National Transparency 
Platform,7 a site that supposedly will house public information related to all state entities. It 
is also not evident how the new LGT is related to the obligations set forth in the energy 
reform laws, the OGP Action Plan, or the decree regarding open data. 
 
Another problem of the transparency system laid out in the energy reform is the treatment 
of withheld information. The laws provide for withholding some types of documents in a 
general manner and without any prior damage test. For example, Article 53 of the 
Geothermal Energy Act (LEG) plainly points out that information regarding plots of land 
with geothermal potential will be withheld. Article 21 of the Law of the Mexican Oil Fund 
(LFMP) establishes that information regarding evaluations, estimates, and analytic 
methodologies that are carried out by the fiduciary is withheld. Furthermore, it establishes, 
in an ambiguous manner and giving great leeway to the authority, that “information that 
puts the Fund at a disadvantage or that benefits a third party with respect to the investments 
or operations of the fiduciary will be withheld.” This violates good international practices as 
well as the resolutions of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, which mandated all 
authorites to carry out the damage test in each case of  information withholding. Said test 
consists of the duty of the authority to weigh and evaluate whether or not it will provide the 
information based on the proper justification and motivation. The withholding must “be 
related to the damage test, in an objective manner, in terms of whether the disclosure of the 
information creates a risk or may cause a loss.”8 
 
The secondary laws of the energy reform do not specify the bodies that are authorized to 
withhold information, nor whether transparency committees will be set up that could 
review these decisions. They also do not regulate where and how frequently the list of 
withheld information must be published. This is particularly worrisome when considering 
that Article 6, Section VIII of the Constitution indicates that it will be the LGT that 
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establishes the scenarios for the withholding of information. In addition to being 
ambiguous and creating undue discretionary power that allows for the withholding of 
information in each law of the energy reform, its constitutionality may even be questioned. 
In this respect, the LGT falls short, since it establishes that the acts of withholding set forth 
in other laws must comply with the LGT; the ideal situation would have been that the 
withholding of information would remain exclusively regulated by this national legislation. 
 
Another deficiency of the secondary legislation is that the different laws address the 
procedures of transparency, accountability, and responsibility within a single chapter and 
practically without any distinctions. This is a common problem both in academic circles as 
well as in public practice. The three concepts tend to be used as synonyms or are 
understood as mechanisms that are automatically linked. Therefore, it is essential to 
emphasize that they are systems that are not equivalent, even though they reinforce each 
other. It cannot be said, for example, that a regime is accountable because it responds to 
requests for information that are made by citizens or because the authorities submit a 
yearly report which nobody evaluates and whose results do not hold up. As a matter of fact, 
this is what happens with the energy reform. It is exactly the case of the yearly report 
presented by the board of directors set forth in Article 113 of the LPM and Article 116 of the 
Law of the Federal Electricity Commission (LCFE), the evaluation set forth in Article 117 of 
the LPM and Article 120 of the LCFE to be carried out by a commissioner appointed by the 
president, or the report prepared by the external auditor of the Mexican Oil Fund 
according to Article 22 of the LFMP. Such reports only comply with certain obligations of 
transparency, although it can not be claimed that with the filing of these reports the 
authority is held accountable, since nothing is said with respect to the principles guiding 
their preparation, the purposes of the evaluation, or the consequences and sanctions 
resulting from the same. 
 
In the following sections, we will address the elements making up the accountability and 
responsibility systems as well as their regulation within the energy reform in more detail. 
We will furthermore demonstrate the consequences of the confusion between the 
procedures and some of the deficiencies that the regulation entails. 
 
Accountability in the Energy Reform 
 
Having an accountability system in place is an indispensable element of the rule of law. As 
soon as the election of rulers has been guaranteed through universal vote and reliable 
procedures, it is necessary to have mechanisms that make it possible for the state bodies to 
be held accountable for the exercise of power that has been conferred upon them. Any 
state body must subject its actions to the rules enshrined in the Constitution as the supreme 
law of the land. Therefore, the accountability system must contain procedures for the 
control of power to ensure that this actually happens. 
 
As a matter of fact, under the rule of law, accountability becomes an essential mechanism 
for appraising the actions of any state body, not only with respect to formal compliance 
with legal limits, but also of the results that are obtained, since it requires efficient and 
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effective performance. This requirement is also translated in the law from its conception, 
not only as a limit of power that permits the exercise of individual freedoms, but also as a 
set of material guarantees of a minimum level of well-being through the protection of the 
human rights contained in the Constitution (Ferrajoli 2008). It therefore imposes an 
obligation to have legal procedures that analyze and qualify actions of the state from this 
perspective, which makes up the accountability system. 
 
In this respect, it is possible to legally conceptualize accountability as the set of rules that 
establish procedures of control of a state body that is under the obligation to report, 
explain, and justify its actions to an independent agency authorized to analyze the acts, 
qualify them as legal, and ensure their compliance with constitutional rights and principles. 
 
As established by Article 25 of the CPEUM, in the case of the energy reform, the generation 
and distribution of electric energy as well as the exploration and exploitation of oil and 
other hydrocarbons must be carried out with efficiency, effectiveness, and a level of 
productivity based on the best international practices. Likewise, the constitutional reform 
specifies, among its goals, promoting the development of society and the protection of the 
environment through the modernization and strengthening of productive state-owned 
companies, keeping the ownership of hydrocarbons and the control of the electrical system 
in the hands of the nation, guaranteeing international standards of efficiency, quality, and 
reliability in terms of supply, solidifying the administration of petroleum revenue, 
promoting long-term savings, and effectively fighting against corruption in the energy 
sector. 
 
Therefore, the accountability system developed in the secondary legislation had to 
establish the procedures through which the Mexican people would be able to ensure that 
constitutional principles were complied with and that the goals established in the reform 
were met, meaning that it should have determined the independent authority designated 
to evaluate the results of activities in the energy sector and by what mechanisms it would 
ensure compliance with the principles of quality, reliability, effectiveness, and efficiency. 
 
Quite to the contrary, and just like in the case of the transparency system, the energy reform 
regulates the accountability system through a series of unconnected rules within the energy 
reform legislation, in addition to referencing the Federal Law of Budget and Financial 
Responsibility. As a result, neither the procedures nor the responsible bodies are clear. 
Despite the fact that Transitional Articles 9 and 20 of the Constitution stipulate that the 
secondary legislation must establish, at least for productive state-owned companies, a system 
of external audits (which is also recommended by international practices)9 and monitoring 
and accountability mechanisms, these devices are hardly mentioned in the energy reform 
legislation. Article 57 of the LPM only specifies that it will be the very board of directors that 
will appoint the external auditor as proposed by the auditing committee,. As long as it is the 
owner of the very body being audited who appoints the external auditor, there appears to be 
no autonomy of the auditor. Moreover, the requirements that must be covered, the purpose 
of the audit, and the possible consequences of any result are not indicated at all. Therefore, 
and in accordance with the definition of accountability provided above, neither the auditing 
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committee nor the external auditor is, in reality, an independent authority that analyzes, 
appraises, and establishes consequences for the results obtained by Pemex. Insofar as the 
LCFE is concerned, in Title Three it regulates both internal as well as external audits in 
exactly the same manner and with the same limitations. 
 
Actually, a suitable accountability procedure for this type of activity within the Mexican 
legal system is the public account, which is the responsibility of the Chamber of Deputies 
by means of the Office of the Superior Auditor of the Federation (ASF), since it deals with 
the most important audit of the generation and the use of federal public resources. Even 
though any public resource must be covered by an evaluation through the public account 
according to Articles 74, 79, and 134 of the CPEUM, the secondary regulation of the energy 
reform is not clear with respect to the form or manner in which this is carried out. Both the 
LPM and the LCFE recognize the public account as the accountability procedure that the 
company will be subject to. Articles 58 and 56, respectively, establish that the ASF will be 
responsible for supervising the actions of PEMEX, CFE, and their subsidiaries in 
accordance with the provisions set forth in the Constitution and the new nature of these 
companies. However, the quoted articles point out that, in addition to the new legal 
framework, “the results of the reviews that, in the exercise of their functions, are carried 
out by the auditing and supervisory entities” must be taken into account; what is unclear, 
therefore, is whether the ASF is expected to only analyze these results or whether it will be 
allowed to conduct its own audits. In the first case, its hands are practically tied, and it will 
hardly be able to carry out a reliable evaluation of the results to determine whether they 
are operating effectively and efficiently. 
 
Both external as well as internal audits conducted in accordance with international 
practices contribute to better governance of an institution and allow the owners of the 
same to identify areas of opportunity in terms of organization and internal processes.10 
However, they fall short with respect to the purpose of accountability, considering that 
they do not usually analyze compliance with the constitutional purposes set forth for that 
body, and they lack the competency to determine sanctions based on the results. 
 
Therefore, in the energy reform legislation, we find sections or chapters designated 
“accountability” that only contain a set of isolated and ambiguous rules ordering the 
preparation of reports without determining their purpose or their consequences. 
Furthermore, the specified audits do not indicate their actual purpose or, the consequences 
of their results, and the body conducting them is not an autonomous authority capable of 
guaranteeing an impartial analysis aimed at verifying compliance with the purposes and 
principles required by the Constitution, nor is it authorized to apply any sanctions. There is 
therefore no accountability system for the energy sector that makes it possible to evaluate 
its progress, acknowledge good practices, and amend errors. There are also no clear 
procedures for monitoring its performance as mandated by the Constitution. 
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Imposition of Responsibility within the Scope of the Energy Reform 
 
As pointed out earlier, it is common to conflate the accountability system with mechanisms 
to prevent and fight corruption. According to Behn (2001), it is incorrect to believe that 
accountability serves to punish corrupt officials rather than evaluate the actions of state 
bodies in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution and the laws. This error is 
based on the frequent confusion between a state body and the official or officials who 
temporarily hold offices within them. An official who holds public office does not act 
individually, but rather executes the powers that the Constitution and the laws vest in the 
agency; therefore, the consequences of these actions are attributable to the agency itself 
and not to the official. The actions of the agency are the result of the set of its powers and 
the public resources that are used. These actions are covered by the accountability system, 
whose purpose is to evaluate the results and determine consequences with respect to the 
agency itself. 
 
Now, when an official abuses his or her office, that is, he or she engages in illegal conduct 
that must be punished, such illegal conduct is covered by another legal system. Any legal 
order must have a system to prevent and fight corruption; this system responds to a 
rationale that is distinct from that of the accountability system, and its subjects, subject 
matter, and procedures are different. According to authors such as Persson, it is incorrect 
to consider corruption to be an agency problem. Relationships of corruption, particularly 
when the corruption is systematic, as it is in Mexico (Casar 2015), represent a problem of 
collective action where there is no principal who is actually interested in whether the 
actions of officials are straightforward and honest. On the contrary, there are incentives for 
anyone who can to make private use of public resources (Persson 2010) such that the 
establishment of monitoring mechanisms such as internal or external audits yields 
ineffective results, if what is sought is preventing and sanctioning illegal acts. 
 
The responsibilities system is based on the idea that an individual must be responsible for 
his or her actions. Bovens (1998) clarifies that the term ‘responsibility’ has several meanings 
when referring to the manner in which an individual should act: the individual is 
‘responsible’ because he or she is rational, because he or she has the aptitude for the task, or 
because the actor’s conduct is based on a certain ethical code. 
 
Weber also emphasizes the need for virtuous actions from the bureaucracy and indicates 
that a bureaucracy operates like a hierarchical structure, with relationships of 
subordination wherein those on the upper levels supervise those on the middle and lower 
levels. Furthermore, there is a relationship of loyalty from those lower in rank toward their 
superiors (Weber 1919). On one hand, the purpose of such a hierarchy is to prevent illegal 
acts by promoting shared values and, on the other hand, to establish internal disciplinary 
procedures by applying administrative sanctions, both of which are intended to provide an 
incentive for virtuous acts from public officials.  
 
 Article 25 of the CPEUM refers to honesty as one of the principles that must govern the 
energy sector. This principle must be interpreted as being aimed at public officials 
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involved in these activities. In turn, the explanatory memorandum specifies, among the 
basic goals and premises of the reform, the intent to “fight corruption in the energy sector 
in an effective manner.” Transitional Article 21 of the constitutional reform emphasizes the 
need to adjust the legal framework to “prevent, investigate, identify, and severely punish” 
any public or private agent who engages in acts or omissions that are contrary to the law or 
whose purpose is to obtain an undue benefit.  
 
Secondary legislation should, as we have said, establish the jurisdiction and the procedures 
to prevent, investigate, identify, and punish these illegal conducts. In contrast, and as with 
the structures for transparency and accountability, an analysis of the chapters on sanctions 
in the energy reform shows a high dispersion of these standards across all laws. 
Furthermore, the secondary laws of the energy reform repeat the traditional scheme of the 
Mexican legal order and establish a series of scenarios that confuse agency obligations with 
illegal acts; for specific examples, see Title V of the LIE, Chapter II of the LH, and Chapter 
V of the Law of the National Agency of Industrial Safety and Environmental Protection in 
the Hydrocarbon Sector (LANS). 
 
In general, there is an ambiguous inventory of conducts and sanctions with unclear 
procedures that confuse the authorities who investigate with those who judge, and, in 
addition, do not guarantee the independence of the sanctioning authority. It is necessary to 
clearly define the procedures for investigating corruption in order to avoid frequent 
violations of due process that result in judicial decisions becoming void. The Supreme 
Court has insisted that the procedure for administrative sanctioning must meet the 
standards of due process according to criminal law, since its effects could have a personal 
and direct impact on the assets and even on the freedoms of the person once he or she is 
removed from office and disqualified.11 Therefore, it is important that procedures be 
established that respect the separation between the authority that investigates and the 
authority that judges, and that also ensure due process. National Anticorruption System 
laws enacted in August 2016 have advanced in this matter. Nevertheless, it remains to be 
seen how these laws will be applied throughout the entire energy sector. 
 
With respect to preventing corruption, the laws of the energy reform contain some 
interesting innovations. For example, they expressly establish the scenarios that can be 
considered conflicts of interest for the counselors of the Fund (Articles 9 through 15 of the 
LFMP), regulating bodies (Article 9 of the Law of Coordinated Regulating Bodies in Energy 
Matters [LORC]), and productive companies (Article 21 of the LPM, Article 20 of the 
LCFE). They further indicate the mechanisms for the dismissal or removal of a party in 
cases where a conflict of interest arises.  
 
Another advance is the obligation to issue codes of conduct that seek to promote virtuous 
actions of officials. For example, Article 15 of the LORC indicates that the institutional 
values are righteousness, honesty, impartiality, respect, and transparency. Article 95 of the 
LPM states that the board of directors will issue a code of ethics and will determine the 
bodies responsible for ensuring compliance.  
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For the prevention of corruption, it is also essential to have measures in place to protect 
those public officials or individuals who wish to report mismanagement and 
misappropriations. Whistleblowing protection is especially relevant when reports are taken 
into account such as the Report to the Nations On Occupational Fraud and Abuse 2014 by the 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), a document identifying the mining, gas, 
and hydrocarbon industries as those with the highest average loss due to fraud. This report 
further points out that the main source of reports of fraud are anonymous, even over the 
phone, and that 40% of the reports come from employees.12 In this respect, the energy 
reform also presents some innovations; for example, Article 37 of the LORC establishes the 
creation of a system for the receipt of anonymous reports and complaints, although it 
seems to be limited to contracting processes.  
 
Although the energy reform has made some progress with respect to the responsibility 
system, there are also significant omissions. Both the LPM (Articles 30 and 31) and the 
LCFE (Articles 29 and 30) exempt all members of the board of directors, including 
secretaries of state, from observing the proper responsibilities of public officials (Title IV of 
the CPEUM), among them administrative and compensatory responsibilities. In reality, 
these articles limit liability to civil damages and losses, which is absurd. It cannot be 
justified that such executives would not be subject to either administrative and 
compensatory or criminal liability, as the case may be, with respect to their actions within 
the productive state-owned companies, where they handle federal public resources and 
national goods. When their acts and omissions can cause damage to public funds, it should 
be asked why it is sufficient that they merely repair said damage when, under equal 
circumstances, other officials can be removed from office and disqualified from holding 
another. While it is certain that PEMEX and CFE are companies, unlike what happens in a 
private company, their Boards of Directors do not make decisions regarding the resources 
of individuals, but rather regarding public resources and goods belonging to the nation. 
This is not a case of private interests that can be identified with a principal who is 
concerned about monitoring them, but rather of common goods that belong to all 
Mexicans. The mechanism for requiring a public officer’s responsibility should have been 
regulated in the same manner as the committee specified in the LFMP, which has a chapter 
regarding the responsibility of the committee, refers to the Law of Inspection and 
Accountability of the Federation, and holds all members administratively liable for the 
damage and losses they cause. 
 
In summary, although provisions for anonymous reports and codes of ethics can be 
considered progress in the fight against corruption, the ambiguity in the typification of 
conduct, procedures, authorities, and sanctions are weaknesses that reduce the efficiency of 
the responsibility system of the energy reform. 
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Challenges to the Implementation of the Energy Reform 
 
The analysis of the regulations regarding transparency, accountability, and responsibility 
within the scope of the energy reform demonstrates that, in these areas, the problems of 
the fragmentation and ambiguity of the Mexican legal order reiterate and place the proper 
functioning and results of the energy sector at risk.  
 
The legal transparency system should not be limited to only providing information but 
should be understood to be a part of human rights and of superior value in a democracy 
(Salazar 2008); thus, the transparency obligation is not fulfilled through the mere 
presentation of periodic reports, but must rather be understood as a deliberate policy of 
the state to systematically produce and use information as a strategic recourse (López and 
Merino et al. 2010). It is important to properly adopt the stipulations in the OGP Action 
Plan 2013-2015, particularly insofar as the association of Mexico with the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative is concerned. These actions strive to provide clear, 
simple, and reusable information in open and uniform formats within the scope of 
networks with interests connected within the energy sector—for example, resource 
supervision, participation in public decision-making, or environmental protection. This 
aims to strengthen the effects of public policy as a result of the presentation of such 
information and its analysis from multiple perspectives and from different nations 
(Haufler 2010). Therefore, it should be a priority for the agencies responsible for 
overseeing the energy sector to articulate a proactive transparency policy that has these 
characteristics.  
 
The fragmentation of the transparency system actually could be reduced as long as the 
entire energy sector follows the provisions of the LGT and the Federal Transparency Act. 
In reality, it would be appropriate to repeal all special rules contained in the energy reform 
and bring all sector authorities under the LGT. This would both improve the gathering of 
information on the National Transparency Platform as well as eliminate the reasons for the 
withholding of information presented by these energy laws. Likewise, the duty of all 
agencies to establish transparency committees that only withhold information after a 
damage test would be made clear. 
 
Insofar as accountability is concerned, it is necessary to strengthen the ASF as an 
autonomous technical body so that it has the actual capacity to evaluate the performance of 
all agencies involved in the energy sector by means of the public account. To be able to do 
so, it is important to promote the legislative changes that permit this strengthening, as well 
as the adjustments of the review procedures that aim to ensure that the results of the public 
account impact subsequent decisions regarding the budget and planning of the sector. In 
this respect, it would be advisable to have specialized agents in the ASF in charge of 
supervising the energy sector, so that they would not be limited to the results of audits 
currently specified by the relevant laws. 
 
It is desirable that, in addition to establishing committees of internal auditors and 
providing for external audits, provisions be established within the legal scope of the ASF 
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for the purpose of providing it with material and human resources to supervise these 
productive state-owned companies, their revenue, and their expenses. This is particularly 
important when taking into account that Articles 59 through 61 of the LIsH specify that the 
resources entering the Fund are to be included in the Account of the Public Federal 
Treasury. Likewise, the exercise of public resources that will be carried out by the 
regulating bodies and by the National Agency of Industrial Safety and Environmental 
Protection must comply with the government budget and accounting rules and regulations 
and should be revised in the public account. Likewise, considering that the ASF also 
conducts a performance evaluation, it should have the capacity to investigate the sector in 
accordance with the goals set forth in the Constitution regarding social responsibility and 
environmental protection, aspects of global interest whose improvement is subject to 
increasing international pressure (Clip 2005). 
 
Insofar as the responsibility system is concerned, the preventive measures in the reform, 
such as the declaration of conflict of interest, ethical codes, and anonymous reports, try to 
reestablish public trust in the actions of public officials, which is urgent due to Mexico’s 
current circumstances. Furthermore, it would be desirable to have a career civil service for 
the energy sector that would allow for the professionalization of public officials and create 
proper incentives for effective, efficient, and honest performance.  
 
In order to reduce the fragmentation of regulations in matters of responsibility, it would be 
advisable to repeal the chapters in the energy laws regarding sanctions and to regulate all 
public officials involved in the sector as being bound by political and administrative 
responsibilities under the new General Law of Administrative Responsibility enacted in 
August 2016. Unfortunately, even after these recent reforms, Mexico still lacks a legal 
system that effectively identifies illegal acts and crimes attributable to public officials and 
establishes the necessary authorities and efficient procedures for investigating and 
punishing illegal conduct. Developing this legislation and, of course, including the energy 
sector within it is an urgent matter. 
 
The energy reform can be a transformative element for the Mexican economy and a motor 
for the development of the country. However, this requires that everyone involved be able 
to trust that the government and the companies act in conformity to the Constitution and 
in an honest manner. This will only be achieved with the proper functioning of 
transparency, accountability, and responsibility legal systems that guarantee the proper 
knowledge and monitoring of the exercise of power. Therefore, bringing the energy 
reform to a successful conclusion entails guaranteeing the respect of the rule of law in 
Mexico. Although there has been progress, arduous work still lies ahead to ensure the 
adequate implementation of the three systems and eliminate the fragmentation of the 
procedures demonstrated in this article. 
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Electronic Resources 
 
www.transparenciapresupuestaria.gob.mx/es/PTP/Datos_Abiertos 
www.datosabiertos.gob  
www.metricadetransparencia.cide.edu/ 
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Endnotes 
 
1 Mexico was characterized, during the twentieth century, by the institutionalization of 
various forms of corporatism from the highest spheres of power with large trade unions 
such as those of Pemex, Luz y Fuerza del Centro, or the Teachers’ Union. Since their birth, 
these bodies have been powerful political organizations that were unconditional allies of 
the government, despite the fact that they achieved rights and concessions for their 
workers. The political use of trade unions resulted in significant corruption, which affected 
the quality of their services and the effectiveness of the institutions. This factor, along with 
the collapse of the Mexican economic model in the 1990s and the pressure of globalization, 
made corporatism unsustainable as a mechanism of political control. This made it 
necessary to think about new forms of worker organization in accordance with the 
requirements of a global market. As pointed out by Jaime Cárdenas (2014, 152), in the 
particular case of PEMEX, trade union corruption caused the worker representative to be 
removed from the Board of Directors within the scope of the energy reform will. For a 
complete overview of this phenomenon in Mexico, see Meyer (1989) and Bizber (1990). 
2 At the end of 2014, the PAN, the PRD, and the PT presented their constitutional reform 
initiatives for the purpose of creating a national anticorruption system. This was not only 
in response to the corruption scandals and the abuse of authority that were all over the 
media (Casa La Palma and Grupo Higa, among many others), but rather due to the pressure 
exerted by an organized civil society and academia through organizations such as the 
Accountability Network, Fundar, México Evalúa, and Mexican Transparency, which 
demonstrated the weakness of the existing institutional mechanisms in effectively fighting 
influence peddling, illegal enrichment, and conflicts of interest. The regulation in effect 
until this time is limited to a mere listing of public officials, obligations, and errors, without 
any clear procedures, as a result of which its efficiency is very limited. 
The Mexican Senate held different working tables combining the proposals both of 
legislators as well as the civil society to generate a draft of the reform. The report by the 
Senate indicates that fighting corruption was crucial for structural reforms. It notes that 
according to the National Index of Corruption and Proper Governance, in 2010 alone 
improper payments for official processes and public services reached thirty-two billion 
Mexican pesos. This situation made it urgent to adopt measures to not only punish acts of 
corruption but also identify the processes that allowed for unjustified discretion in such a 
manner so that they could be corrected within the public administration. Therefore, the 
constitutional reform builds a system, coordinated among the three branches and 
incorporating citizen participation, that strives to establish public policies to prevent 
corruption as well as fight and impose sanctions on it. To do so, the National 
Anticorruption System was established, which is a coordinating instance between the 
authorities of all levels of government with the purpose of adopting measures to 
institutionally prevent corruption. Likewise, it strengthens the Ministry of the Public 
Function in terms of internal control and the Main Comptroller of the Federation in terms 
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of monitoring the use of public resources, with the possibility of preparing individual 
reports and filing a suit before the special inspector whenever the existence of crimes of 
corruption is presumed. Furthermore, it authorizes the Federal Court of Administrative 
Justice to impose administrative responsibilities and impose sanctions. As of the date of the 
writing of this article, the laws that will implement the National Anticorruption System are 
still pending. 
3 If the accountability system is a set of standards, it is possible to identify them based on 
their areas of validity. According to Kelsen, validity refers to the specific existence of a 
standard that depends on having been created through the procedures and the bodies 
authorized to do so. The standards can be analyzed in four areas of validity, to wit: 
personal, material, spatial, and temporary (Kelsen, [1960] 2002: 45). 
 
4 See http://www.opengovpartnership.org. 
 
5 It should be clarified that, according to Article 32 of the LH, geologic, geophysical, and 
petrochemical information belongs to the nation. 
 
6 www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5382838&fecha=20/02/2015. 
 
7 General Transparency Act, Article 49. The guaranteeing organizations will develop, adopt, 
implement, and put the electronic platform into service that makes it possible to comply with 
the procedures, obligations, and rules set forth in this present law for the obligated subjects and 
guaranteeing organizations, in accordance with the standards and regulations that are 
established by the national system, in conformity with the needs of accessibility of users. 
 
8 Africa Freedom of Information Center (Kampala/Africa), et al., The global principles on 
national security and the right to information (Open Society Foundation, 2013). Amparo 
proceeding for review 173/2012, Paragraph 207. Reporting Judge: Judge José Ramón Cossío. 
 
9 This is a recommendation that is reiterated both by the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) as well as by Braithwaite y Drahos (2000). 
 
10 See www.acfe.com/rttn/docs/2014-report-to-nations.pdf and the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI). 
 
11 On repeated occasions, the court has ruled with respect to the standard of the 
administrative processes of liabilities, indicating that the standard must be the same as that 
for criminal processes. This has been established in different jurisprudential theses. For 
example: “Administrative responsibility of public officials. The principle of congruence in 
the ruling of the respective resolution governs with the same scope as under criminal law.” 
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“Administrative responsibilities of public officials. Article 21, Section I, of the respective 
federal law does not violates the guarantee of a hearing.” Record No. 168557, isolated thesis, 
Second Tribunal: www.scjn.gob.mx. 
 
12 www.acfe.com/rttn/docs/2014-report-to-nations.pdf. In the Executive Summary, it states 
the following: “Tips are consistently and by far the most common detection method. Over 
40 percent of all cases were detected by a tip, more than twice the rate of any other 
detection method. Employees accounted for nearly half of all tips that led to the discovery 
of fraud.”  
